Analysis of Traffic Conflicts in a Mixed-Airspace Evaluation of Airborne Separation Assurance by Lewis, Timothy A.
Analysis of Trafﬁc Conﬂicts in a Mixed-Airspace
Evaluation of Airborne Separation Assurance
Timothy A. Lewis∗
NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA 23681, USA
A pair of human-in-the-loop simulation evaluations of a distributed air/ground separation assurance sys-
tem have been conducted to investigate the function allocation between humans and automation systems as
well as ground-based and airborne agents in the Next Generation Air Transportation System and beyond.
This paper focuses on an analysis of certain critical conﬂicts observed between self-separating aircraft and
ground-managed trafﬁc in the same airspace. The principal cause of each conﬂict is identiﬁed and potential
mitigations are discussed, such as: the sharing of trajectory intent information between the ground and the
air; more cautious trajectory planning by the self-separating aircraft; andmore equitable rules-of-the-road be-
tween the self-separating aircraft and ground-managed aircraft. This analysis will inform the ongoing design
of an airborne separation assurance automation tool.
I. Introduction
Separation assurance is a critical service provided by air trafﬁc controllers to aircraft operating under Instrument
Flight Rules (IFR). How and by whom this function will be performed in the future is a pivotal concern in the de-
veloping Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). The allocation of separation assurance functions
between humans and automated systems, between agents on the ground and in the air, and between centralized and
distributed control paradigms has great implications for the evolution of air trafﬁc management and the future of air
transportation. This question is among those being explored by the Concepts and Technology Development Project
under the NASA Airspace Systems Program.
To investigate, NASA has developed operational concepts and enabling technologies for en route separation as-
surance and trajectory management that change the allocation of functions from the state of the practice today. In the
concept presented here, en route controllers will use automation tools of increasing sophistication to manage greater
numbers of IFR aircraft, thus increasing airspace capacity and reducing the costs of the ground-based operation. In
the air, a new self-separation operation will allow aircraft to ﬂy autonomously and independently from ground-based
control, providing greater operational ﬂexibility for those operators that choose to equip. Together, this air/ground
concept for separation assurance represents a promising allocation of functions for NextGen and beyond.
This concept has recently been evaluated in a pair of human-in-the-loop simulation experiments, focusing on the
interaction between IFR trafﬁc managed by an advanced ground-based air trafﬁc control system, and self-separating
aircraft following what has been dubbed the Autonomous Flight Rules (AFR) concept of operations. One experiment
focused on the perspective of the IFR controller, and the other on the AFR pilot. This paper presents an analysis of the
AFR operation and some practical challenges arising at the conﬂuence of AFR and IFR trafﬁc in the same airspace. In
particular, the principal causes of certain critical conﬂicts observed between AFR and IFR aircraft are identiﬁed, and
potential mitigations are discussed. The results of this analysis have implications for design of the conﬂict detection
and resolution algorithms in the air, rules-of-the-road between ground-managed and self-separating aircraft in mixed
airspace, and the information-sharing architecture of NextGen and beyond.
∗Aerospace Engineer, Crew Systems and Aviation Operations Branch, M/S 152, AIAA Member.
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II. Background
A. Concept of Operations
The concept presented here consists of essentially two distinct separation assurance systems: i) a ground-based system
responsible for providing separation to conventional IFR trafﬁc, and ii) a distributed airborne system in which equipped
aircraft self-separate from other trafﬁc according to AFR rules. These systems have been designed in a compatible
way so that the two operations may coexist in the same airspace; i.e., a mixture of both operations, reﬂecting a variety
of equipage levels and different uses of the airspace.
1. Ground-Based Separation
The ground-based concept represents an evolution of the air trafﬁc control (ATC) system and IFR operations as they
exist today. In this concept, controllers are assisted by a set of decision support tools with which to manage an
increased number of aircraft equipped to receive data link clearances. These features serve to multiply the number of
aircraft that can be managed by a single human controller. However, the relationship between the controller and the
IFR pilot remains unchanged from today: the controller is responsible for ensuring separation while accommodating
the needs of the airspace user, and the IFR pilot is responsible for following ATC clearances and instructions.
2. Airborne Separation
In parallel to ground-based separation is the airborne concept for self-separation under AFR. This operation is enabled
by the availability of Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS-B) as well as the development of onboard
decision support tools to assist the pilot in performing separation functions. With AFR, an onboard tool continuously
scans the ADS-B surveillance information broadcast from nearby trafﬁc and alerts the pilot if any conﬂicts are detected.
In that event, the tool recommends a strategic route modiﬁcation or a tactical vector to be ﬂown in order to resolve the
conﬂict.
To ﬂy AFR, i) the operator must equip with ADS-B IN and other avionics to support the onboard automation tool,
and ii) the pilot must take on the responsibility for self-separation during the en route phase of ﬂight. In return, AFR
is envisioned to allow the operator to better achieve its business-optimal trajectory through greater control over routes,
altitudes, and speeds while being subject to fewer ground-based trafﬁc ﬂow constraints.
3. Mixed Operations
In mixed operations, IFR and AFR aircraft coexist in the same airspace at the same ﬂight levels. The pair of exper-
iments presented here considered one particular division of separation responsibility. In this division, the controller
remains responsible for IFR trafﬁc, resolving conﬂicts arising among IFR aircraft. At the same time, the AFR aircraft
self-separate and resolve conﬂicts with other AFR aircraft as well as with IFR trafﬁc. Thus, AFR aircraft relieve the
controller of the burden of responsibility for handling AFR/IFR conﬂicts. This design decision allows AFR aircraft to
operate independently of the ground without increasing the workload of the IFR controller or substantially changing
the design of the air trafﬁc control system as it is today. This decision is being considered as a transition step for
the initial implementation of airborne separation; NextGen in the far-term might see a more equitable distribution of
conﬂict resolution responsibility between the air and the ground. A thorough description of the AFR concept and
AFR/IFR mixed operations can be found in Refs. 1 and 2.
B. Human-in-the-Loop Simulation Experiment
The mixed-operations concept was evaluated in a pair of jointly conducted human-in-the-loop simulation experiments
completed in late 2012. The ﬁrst experiment, conducted in the Airspace Operations Laboratory at NASA Ames
Research Center, focused on the effect of the AFR aircraft on the ability of the controller to manage the IFR trafﬁc. The
second experiment, conducted in the Air Trafﬁc Operations Laboratory at NASA Langley Research Center, focused
on the ability of the AFR pilot to resolve all AFR/IFR conﬂicts arising in mixed airspace. A complete discussion of
both of these experiments and their results can be found in Ref. 3. This paper focuses on the “exploratory” component
of the airborne-focused experiment conducted at Langley.
In the exploratory component, each week featured six AFR crews consisting of two airline pilots each. Each crew
ﬂew six scenarios of 30 minutes (min) in length through Cleveland Air Route Trafﬁc Control Center (ARTCC) airspace
populated by simulated IFR trafﬁc managed by three air trafﬁc controllers. Two weeks of this data were collected.
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These runs were intended to evaluate the mixed operation from the perspective of the AFR pilot under typical en route
conditions without any scripted anomalies or off-nominal scenarios. All ﬂying was conducted in cruise before top of
descent.
Further, these runs examined the effect of trajectory intent information sharing from the IFR aircraft to the AFR
aircraft. In half of the runs, the IFR aircraft broadcast only the ADS-B state vector (position and velocity) in accordance
with the FAA’s 2020 minimum equipage mandate.4 In the other half, the IFR aircraft also broadcast up to four ADS-B
trajectory change points, representing a future NextGen condition with greater trajectory information availability for
ﬂight deck users. This paper focuses on the state-only, intent-poor runs of the ﬁrst half, which represent a more
challenging condition for the AFR aircraft.
The experiments employed the Aircraft Simulation for Trafﬁc Operations Research (ASTOR) for AFR aircraft,
which is a desktop computer simulation of a commercial transport with a modern glass cockpit based on the Boeing 777.
The ASTOR simulators were connected to the Multi-Aircraft Control System (MACS), simulating the Display System
Replacement (DSR) interface with advanced controller tools at Cleveland Center used to control the IFR trafﬁc.
III. Analysis of Conﬂicts
A. Preliminaries
This analysis uses the 5 nautical miles (nmi) lateral and 1000 feet (ft) vertical separation standards commonly adopted
for en route ﬂight. Aircraft closer than this standard are said to be in loss of separation (LOS). No losses of separation
were observed in all of the exploratory runs in the Langley experiment.
Two aircraft are said to be in conﬂict when a comparison of their predicted trajectories reveals a future LOS within
a certain time horizon; in this experiment, 10 min. Onboard each AFR aircraft, the Autonomous Operations Planner
(AOP) software tool continuously scans the ADS-B broadcasts for conﬂicts with surrounding trafﬁc. Upon detection
of a conﬂict, AOP alerts the AFR crew and provides a set of appropriate conﬂict resolution maneuvers for the pilot to
execute. The reader is directed to Ref. 5 for a detailed description of AOP.
Ideally, each conﬂict would be detected at the time horizon of 10 min. However, due to the error and uncertainty
involved in trajectory prediction, and the dynamic nature of maneuvering air trafﬁc, conﬂicts may arise and be detected
with less than the maximum warning time. In the worst cases, an AFR aircraft may have under a minute to react to an
IFR conﬂict.
The amount of warning time is generally related to the “difﬁculty” of the required conﬂict resolution from the AFR
pilot’s perspective. A conﬂict with 5 to 10 min of warning time can be solved strategically using a modiﬁed route via
the ﬂight management system (FMS). Under 5 min, a more tactical resolution is required, given to the pilot as a vector
or altitude change to ﬂy directly using the mode control panel. Conﬂicts detected with less than 5 min to go are known
as pop-up conﬂicts. As time grows short and the aircraft progress closer to LOS, larger maneuvers are required to
avoid the conﬂict and the workload increases for the AFR pilot.
As discussed before, the AFR aircraft in the experiment were responsible for resolving all conﬂicts arising with
IFR trafﬁc. In order to provide extra “breathing room,” AOP was conﬁgured to apply a lateral separation standard of
8 nmi rather than 5 nmi to IFR aircraft. The extra distance is known as the IFR buffer. For the remainder of the paper,
conﬂict detections and reported values for warning time are derived from AOP’s trajectory predictions using a lateral
separation standard of 8 nmi.
For the AFR operation to be acceptable and beneﬁcial in practice, pop-up conﬂicts with a very short amount of
warning time must be a rare event. This is a crucial concern for the design of the separation assurance system on the
ﬂight deck, the controller procedures and automation tools, as well as the information sharing architecture of NextGen.
The following analysis is focused on the AFR/IFR pop-up conﬂicts observed in the experiment that meet the
following conditions:
1. The AFR aircraft was in lateral navigation (LNAV) and vertical navigation (VNAV) autoﬂight system modes at
the moment of conﬂict detection. In this state, the autoﬂight system is “fully coupled” with the FMS, and it is
considered to be the nominal mode for AFR ﬂight.
2. The amount of warning time at conﬂict detection was less than or equal to 5 min. During simulation debrief
sessions, pilot and controller participants suggested this as a minimum amount of time for a conﬂict to be
considered normal and routine.
While there were many other conﬂicts observed during the experiment, it is warranted to give extra attention to
those meeting these conditions. These conﬂicts tend to be “initiator” events, marking the transition between routine
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AFR ﬂight and a period of signiﬁcantly increased workload for the AFR pilot. The following analysis is concerned
with the common causes of these conﬂicts and potential mitigations thereof.
B. Conﬂict Causes and Mitigations
The remainder of the paper will use the terminology of ownship to denote the AFR aircraft and intruder for the IFR
aircraft in a given conﬂict encounter.
Table 1 shows a tally of the vertical conditions of the ownship and intruder for all conﬂicts at the moment of initial
detection. In 33 out of the 35 conﬂicts, either the ownship or the intruder was involved with some sort of vertical
maneuver; in only two of the cases were both aircraft level and co-altitude. Twenty-six of the conﬂicts occurred
when the ownship was level, and 14 of those involved an intruder leveling off at top-of-climb. It is clear that there is
an inﬂuence between altitude changes by either aircraft and the occurrence of pop-up conﬂicts, more so than lateral
maneuvering alone.
Table 1. Tally of ownship and intruder vertical conditions at initial conﬂict detection.
Intruder
LVL BOC CLB TOC TOD DES BOD
Ownship
LVL 2 4 2 14 4 0 0 26
BOC 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 3
CLB 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
TOC 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
TOD 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
DES 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BOD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 4 3 14 4 0 1 35
LVL Level ﬂight
BOC Bottom of climb
CLB Climbing ﬂight
TOC Top of climb
TOD Top of descent
DES Descending ﬂight
BOD Bottom of descent
A full list of conﬂicts is given in Table 2 in the Appendix. The following subsections describe a set of common
conﬂict causes identiﬁed by a careful examination of the recorded data from each ownship ﬂight.
Cause 1: Intruder is climbing or descending and levels out at the ownship’s altitude.
The intruder is climbing from below or descending from above the ownship, which is ﬂying level. AOP does not detect
a conﬂict with the intruder’s predicted climb or descent trajectory; there is no conﬂict with the intruder if it continues
to climb or descend at its current vertical speed. However, at the moment that the intruder levels out at the ownship’s
altitude, a conﬂict is detected on the new, level trajectory. (4 of 35 cases)
Example: (Conﬂict 1) The ownship is level at FL370a and the intruder is climbing from below on a crossing path
from the right. Intruder levels out at FL370 and causes a pop-up conﬂict with the ownship with 1:32 min of warning.
The ownship makes a left turn to resolve the conﬂict, following AOP’s guidance.
The trajectories for the ownship and intruder are shown in Fig. 1. In this ﬁgure and subsequent others, the following
conventions are used:
• The ownship trajectory is shown in blue and the intruder trajectory in red. The conﬂict duration on both plots
is highlighted in amber ().
• In the lateral plot, the trajectories are shown in a local north (N) and east (E) coordinate system with distances in
nautical miles. Each aircraft’s initial position and heading is marked by a chevron. The as-ﬂown trajectory for
each aircraft is shown in solid (—), and the trajectory prediction of each aircraft made by AOP on the ownship
at the time of initial conﬂict detection is shown in dashed (– – –).
• The vertical plot shows the ﬂight level (FL) versus time for each aircraft. The time shown is the number
of seconds (s) since the start of the simulation run. The time span shown here corresponds to the as-ﬂown
trajectory segment shown in the lateral plot. For both aircraft, the as-ﬂown trajectory is shown in solid (—). The
last conﬂict-free trajectory prediction that AOP made before the conﬂict detection is shown in dashed (– – –).
aFL denotes the ﬂight level altitude convention based on barometric pressure, in hundreds of feet. FL370 denotes a ﬂight level of 37,000 ft.
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The trajectory prediction at the initial conﬂict detection (i.e., the trajectory upon which the detection is based) is
shown in dash-dot (— - — - —). The dash-dot trajectory is not visible in Fig. 1 because it is concident with the
as-ﬂown trajectory in solid.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
E [nmi]
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
N
 [
n
m
i]
820 840 860 880 900 920
Time [s]
FL360
FL370
FL380
F
li
g
h
t 
le
v
el
Figure 1. Conﬂict 1 trajectories. Left: lateral, right: vertical.
This encounter can be considered a missed detection. AOP did not detect this conﬂict because it was not aware of
the altitude to which the intruder was cleared to climb. Several mitigations for this case are possible:
• The ownship must be provided with the intruder’s target altitude. This could be obtained by a number of ways,
for example: the ADS-B target state report, whereby the intruder broadcasts the current value in the altitude
window of its mode control panel; or by a data link of the intruder’s clearance altitude from the ground-based
controller automation system. With this target altitude, AOP can predict when the intruder will level out and
provide the pilot with more warning time.
• AOP must be more conservative when in the proximity of such an intruder, assuming that the intruder can level
out at any altitude. This approach could provide the pilot with more warning time at the cost of more false
alarms.
• The controller or ground-based automation must not be permitted to level out the intruder at the ownship’s
altitude and create such a conﬂict. In the example here, the controller might hold the intruder at a lower altitude
until it passes by the ownship, thereafter clearing it to FL370.
It should be noted that in the real world a controller would not be comfortable with allowing such a hazard to unfold
without intervention. However, in the experiment, controllers were instructed that the AFR aircraft were responsible
for and capable of providing all separation from IFR trafﬁc. Thus, they allowed many of these conﬂicts to unfold for
the sake of testing the AOP tool.
Cause 2: Intruder is climbing but will level out below the ownship.
The intruder is ﬂying level below the ownship, and the pair are conﬂict free. Then, the intruder begins a climb and
AOP detects a conﬂict on the intruder’s new trajectory. However, the intruder is cleared to a lower altitude than the
ownship’s current altitude, and will level out harmlessly below. (4 of 35 cases)
Example: (Conﬂict 4) The ownship is level at FL390 and the intruder is level at FL370 on a crossing track from
the left. The intruder begins a climb and AOP detects a conﬂict with 1:57 min of warning. The pilot initiates an AOP-
guided right turn to resolve the conﬂict. However, the intruder levels out at the cleared altitude of FL380, passing
below the ownship. This conﬂict is shown in Fig. 2.
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Figure 2. Conﬂict 4 trajectories. Left: lateral, right: vertical.
This situation can be considered a false alarm. AOP did not know the intruder’s intended altitude and assumed
it would continue climbing at the instantaneous vertical speed and enter into LOS with the ownship. In reality, the
intruder presented little risk to the ownship and the resolution maneuver was ultimately unnecessary.
Potential mitigations for this cause:
• As discussed in the previous example, AOP can avoid this situation if it is provided with the intruder’s target
altitude via broadcast or data link.
• Suppose AOP knows with high certainty that the controller or ground-based automation will not allow the
intruder to climb into LOS in this case, based on an implicit right-of-way rule. If this is a reliable rule, then AOP
does not need to react to the climbing intruder in this case, even if it does not know the intruder’s target altitude.
However, there remains the risk of altitude overshoot by the intruder aircraft regardless of its clearance.
In the inverse of this case, the intruder would be descending from above the ownship, causing a conﬂict, although
the intruder is planning to level out above the ownship. This case, although certainly possible, was not observed during
the experiment.
Cause 3: Intruder descends into the ownship.
The intruder is ﬂying level above the ownship and the pair are conﬂict free. Then, the intruder begins a descent, which
causes a conﬂict with the ownship. (4 of 35 cases)
Example: (Conﬂict 10) The ownship is level at FL380 and the intruder is level at FL390, ﬂying on similar tracks.
The intruder beings a descent and AOP detects a conﬂict with nearly zero warning. AOP, unable to ﬁnd a conﬂict
resolution maneuver, instructs the pilot to maintain current track and altitude. The intruder does not pass closer than
6 nmi laterally to the ownship, and a LOS does not occur. The conﬂict clears once the intruder levels out at FL370.
This conﬂict is shown in Fig. 3.
The mitigations for this case are similar to those previously discussed:
• AOP needs earlier information about the intruder’s impending descent. If the intruder’s planned TOD is broad-
cast as a trajectory change point, then AOP can react in advance and provide the pilot with more warning time.
• AOP must be overly conservative and assume any aircraft can descend at any time. Recognizing the inevitability
that the intruder will need to descend, AOP could act preemptively and provide a route modiﬁcation to the AFR
pilot that increases the lateral separation between the two aircraft.
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Figure 3. Conﬂict 10 trajectories. Left: lateral, right: vertical.
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Figure 4. Conﬂict 19 lateral trajectories.
• The controller must vector the intruder to achieve lateral separation before clearing the intruder to descend. It
is interesting in this case that the aircraft were laterally separated throughout the intruder’s descent, but AOP
detected the conﬂict due to its use of the 8 nmi IFR buffer.
Cause 4: Intruder turns into the ownship.
The intruder turns, creating a conﬂict with the ownship. (4 of 35 cases)
Example: (Conﬂict 19) The ownship and intruder are both level at FL370. The ownship has a planned right turn
upcoming on the active route, which is conﬂict-free with the intruder. The intruder then makes a left turn, and AOP
detects a conﬂict with 4:28 min of warning. AOP advises the pilot to remain on the current track and not to make the
planned turn, thus resolving the conﬂict. This conﬂict is shown in Fig. 4.
This conﬂict was caused by the intruder’s unannounced turn. The mitigations are similar to the previously-
discussed vertical cases:
• AOP needs information about the intruder’s turn. If the turn is a part of the intruder’s ﬂight plan or FMS active
route, then it can be shared via an ADS-B trajectory change point or a data link from the ground. If the intruder
is ﬂying a vector from ATC, then the target track to which the intruder is turning can be shared via the ADS-B
target state report.
• Without the trajectory information, AOPmust be overly conservative, assuming any intruder can turn at any time
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and cause such a conﬂict. This requires a lateral buffer, such as the 8 nmi IFR buffer employed here. Rather
than simply increasing the separation distance, the buffer may be dependent on the speed and geometry of the
ownship and intruder trajectories. This solution comes at the cost of increased airspace volume use and a loss
of trajectory efﬁciency.
• The controller or ground-based automation must be restricted from issuing this heading change and creating this
pop-up conﬂict. The controller should wait until the aircraft pass each other before clearing the intruder to turn,
or alternatively clear the intruder to a different vector that will give the AFR aircraft sufﬁcient warning time to
resolve the conﬂict.
This cause was also observed with climbing intruders, where the intruder made a turn during a climb that caused
the pop-up conﬂict.
Cause 5: Transient intruder vertical speed creates a brief false alarm.
When the intruder’s vertical speed is changing, such as during top of climb or top of descent, AOP can detect a brief
conﬂict even though the aircraft are actually conﬂict-free. (11 of 35 cases)
Example: (Conﬂict 2) The ownship is level at FL390 and the intruder is climbing from below on a crossing track
from the left. The pair are conﬂict free while the intruder is climbing. However, at the moment the intruder levels out
at FL380, AOP detects a conﬂict with 2:30 min until LOS. The ownship turns right to resolve the conﬂict even though
the intruder is not a threat. This conﬂict is shown in Fig. 5.
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Figure 5. Conﬂict 2 trajectories. Left: lateral, right: vertical.
This is a spurious false alarm caused by the way AOP performs trajectory prediction based on the ADS-B state
vector. As the intruder levels out, its vertical rate reduces from about 1500 feet per minute (fpm) to zero. However,
during this vertical deceleration, at one instant the intruder broadcasts a state vector indicating a vertical speed of
290 fpm. At this instant, AOP creates a trajectory projection based on the instantaneous vertical speed and assumes
the intruder will continue in a slow climb at this rate. AOP detects a conﬂict with the intruder based on this trajectory
prediction, which lasts for about 10 s.
There is no fault on the part of the controller in this case: the intruder was never a problem for the ownship, either
during climb or during level off. Potential mitigations:
• Within AOP’s current design, the problem is obviated by providing trajectory intent information, either via the
target altitude or a vertical trajectory change point. With this information, AOP does not have to rely on the
less-accurate state vector projection.
• AOP receives the ADS-B state vector from the trafﬁc at a frequency of 1 hertz, and could potentially use the
information about the intruder’s changing vertical speed to better predict its future trajectory through mode
identiﬁcation and hybrid state estimation.6
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In other examples, the transient detection occurred as the intruder began to descend from above the ownship, and the
instantaneous vertical speed projection gave an initially shallower descent.
Cause 6: Improper climb procedure by the AFR pilot.
One of the conﬂicts was clearly caused by the AFR pilot not following proper procedure, not due to a maneuver by
the IFR aircraft.
Example: (Conﬂict 3) The ownship is level at FL350 and the intruder (A) is level at FL360 approaching from
the opposite direction, and the pair are conﬂict-free. The ownship detects a conﬂict with a different intruder (B) with
9:58 min of warning. The pilot selects a vertical resolution provided by AOP, which places a step climb to FL360 on
the ownship’s route in 42 nmi. However, rather than waiting to reach the step waypoint, the ownship pilot executes an
immediate cruise altitude change to FL360, causing a pop-up with the intruder (A) with 3:42 of warning. The ownship
executes a right turn during the climb in order to resolve the conﬂict. The pop-up with (A) is shown in Fig. 6.
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Figure 6. Conﬂict 3 trajectories. Top: lateral, bottom: vertical.
This conﬂict can be considered a blunder on the part of the AFR pilot. The best mitigation in this case is for the
AFR pilot to follow the proper procedure for executing a vertical conﬂict resolution. The pilot should wait to climb at
the step point rather than climbing immediately. Further, in the event that the pilot would like to climb sooner, AOP
should be consulted to verify that the proposed trajectory change is conﬂict-free before executing. The pilot is not
permitted to execute a maneuver that creates such a conﬂict according to the AFR rules and procedures.
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IV. Summary and Conclusions
The AFR concept and AOP tool have been designed to i) enable the AFR pilot to take on responsibility for
separation under en route conditions within acceptable workload limits; ii) to do so in IFR airspace alongside trafﬁc
of mixed equipage without substantially changing the air trafﬁc control system as it exists today; and iii) in doing
so provide immediate business-case beneﬁts to operators that choose to equip. The pair of experiments described
previously addressed goals i) and ii), and the Langley experiment presented here focused on i) speciﬁcally.
In the exploratory scenarios analyzed here, there were no losses of separation, and AFR/AOP was successful from
this perspective. However, due to the nature of the near-term trafﬁc environment, the AFR operation experienced a
number of short-term, pop-up conﬂicts with IFR aircraft with less than 5 min of warning time for conﬂict resolution
by the AFR pilot. Conﬂicts with much less than 5 min of warning were generally considered to be unacceptable to the
pilots and controllers who participated in the experiment.
This paper explored the common causes of these conﬂicts, generally relating to the difﬁculty of predicting the
trajectory of a climbing intruder who is not sharing any trajectory intent information. Three general approaches for
mitigating these conﬂicts were identiﬁed:
1. It is difﬁcult to avoid a maneuvering aircraft whose trajectory intent is not known. Beyond the mandated ADS-B
state vector, AOP has been designed to incorporate information such as the target state report and trajectory
change points into its conﬂict detection process. This experiment3 and previous work7 have shown the dramatic
value of a small amount of near-term trajectory intent on the performance of AOP’s conﬂict detection algorithms.
Within AOP’s current design, the availability of this information reduces the number of conﬂicts overall as well
as the required amount of higher-workload tactical maneuvering.
This information could conceivably be shared via ADS-B in the future, although there is no strong business case
for the IFR operator to equip to broadcast this information if it only beneﬁts the AFR operation. Alternatively,
the SystemWide Information Management8 component of NextGen may provide a method of delivery for trafﬁc
trajectory information from the ground to the AFR ﬂight deck.
2. Without accurate trajectory intent information, the algorithms within AOP must be much more conservative in
the vicinity of IFR aircraft. This approach must take into account not only the uncertainty in the prediction
of the intruder’s nominal trajectory based on the current state vector, but also the uncertainty in the intruder’s
short-term intent. This can be accomplished through the use of intelligent, geometry-dependent airspace buffers
in both the lateral and vertical dimensions that ensure a sufﬁcient amount of warning time for the AFR aircraft
to respond to any IFR conﬂict. The same problem can be posed as one of ﬂexibility preservation9 or complexity
avoidance: AOP should detect upcoming regions of high trafﬁc density or other difﬁculty and preemptively offer
an alternative route—one with fewer expected conﬂicts—to the pilot.
The principal feasibility question of this approach is: can such a buffer be implemented without consuming an
undue amount of airspace and causing an impractical number of false alarms? If the required IFR buffer is too
large, then the impact to the feasibility and beneﬁts case for AFR could be detrimental.
3. Outside of AOP, other allocations of separation responsibility between the IFR controller and the AFR pilot
warrant examination. As the automation support tools available to the controller become more sophisticated,
they could be designed with the self-separating aircraft in mind. Additionally, a more equitable distribution of
conﬂict priority in certain geometric encounters between IFR and AFR aircraft could make all the difference
in the feasibility of the overall mixed operation. NASA is currently examining other such function allocations,
outside the “IFR always has priority, AFR always gives way” approach presented here.
This project will likely move forward on all three of these fronts. It is clear that all three issues are interrelated,
and design decisions about one cannot be made without considering the others.
This work is motivated in part by an important prior result: that many AFR aircraft can be introduced to IFR
airspace without increasing the controller workload.10 If the issues related to pop-up conﬂicts described in this paper
can be solved within the paradigm of “AFR avoids IFR,” then this concept has the potential to be introduced sooner
than other concepts requiring more extensive deployment of advanced ground-based decision-support automation.
This could reduce delays and increase capacity throughout the National Airspace System, and provide more optimal
trajectories as an incentive for operators to equip.
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Appendix: Conﬂict Data
Table 2 lists the 35 conﬂicts presented in Section III. Each conﬂict is given an identifying ID. The amount of
warning time and the ownship and intruder vertical conditions at initial condition are also listed. Finally, each conﬂict
is associated with one of the conﬂict causes presented in Section III, with the exception seven cases marked by (−):
these are primarily false alarms attributed to an AOP conﬂict detection issue that is beyond the scope of this paper.
Table 2. Enumerated pop-up conﬂicts.
Conﬂict ID Warning [s] Ownship Intruder Cause ID
1 92 LVL TOC 1
2 150 LVL TOC 5
3 222 BOC LVL 6
4 117 LVL BOC 2
5 276 LVL CLB 4
6 289 LVL TOC 5
7 125 TOD BOD 1
8 12 CLB LVL −
9 0 LVL TOD 3
10 0 LVL TOD 3
11 155 LVL TOD 3
12 48 CLB LVL −
13 76 LVL TOC 5
14 203 LVL CLB 4
15 265 LVL TOC 5
16 273 LVL TOC 5
17 165 LVL TOD 3
18 221 LVL TOC 1
19 268 LVL LVL 4
20 209 LVL LVL 4
21 241 BOC CLB −
22 16 TOC LVL −
23 12 TOC LVL −
24 198 LVL TOC 5
25 274 LVL TOC 1
26 121 LVL BOC 2
27 177 LVL TOC 5
28 55 LVL BOC 2
29 281 LVL TOC 5
30 13 TOC LVL −
31 282 LVL TOC 5
32 247 LVL BOC 2
33 18 BOC LVL −
34 228 LVL TOC 5
35 233 LVL TOC 5
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